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ESSAY
The Quick (Spending) and the Dead:
The Agency Costs of Forever
Philanthropy
Brian Galle*
American philanthropic institutions control upwards of a trillion
dollars of wealth. Because contributions to these entities are deductible from
both income and estate taxes, and the entities’ earnings are tax-free, that trillion
dollars is heavily underwritten by contemporary taxpayers. Law offers little
assurance that those who pay will be those who benefit. To the contrary, since
these subsidies become more valuable the longer charitable assets are left
unspent, the law strongly encourages philanthropies to save rather than spend,
even in situations of great current need. Other legal rules further encourage
grantmaking institutions to strive to exist “in perpetuity.”
This Essay offers new empirical evidence of the social cost of forever
philanthropy, that is, of institutions that long outlive their founders. Drawing
on a relatively unique dataset of foundation donors, and combining it with a
large archive of tax returns filed by private foundations, I search for evidence
that managers of long-lasting organizations depart significantly from the
preferences of the organization’s supporters. I find that a firm’s overhead, or the
ratio of administrative expenses to grants made, jumps by about 12% as soon
as the organization’s last living donor dies. Payout rates, or the share of assets
spent each year, move sharply in the opposite direction, falling about 7% at
that time.

*
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I’m grateful for advice, assistance,
and commentary from Dan Halperin, Henry Hansmann, Daniel Hemel, Shelly Layser, Ray Madoff,
Ben Marx, David Schizer, Ben Soskis, Rich Steinberg, and Eric Talley, as well as attendees of the
Giving in Time Conference organized by the Urban Institute and the Boston College Forum on
Philanthropy and the Public Good.
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I interpret these findings as evidence of substantial agency costs. Since
the timing of the donor’s death is relatively random, these outcomes offer
convincing causal evidence that the ability of a donor to monitor her
foundation’s managers importantly affects whether those managers follow her
wishes. I argue that overhead and payout changes in the directions I observe
strongly suggest that managers, once free from direct oversight, are operating
the firm for their own comfort and security. Thus, by unnaturally extending the
lifespan of foundations, law is encouraging wasteful allocation of taxpayer
supported charitable resources.
Therefore, I suggest several policy options that would reduce the agencycost problem. Among others, I support maintaining or increasing legal
requirements for mandatory distributions by private foundations and closing
legal loopholes offered by a relatively new charitable phenomenon, the donoradvised fund.
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INTRODUCTION
Forever, the pop icon Prince told us, is a mighty long time.1
Despite our ambitions, human projects rarely last a generation, let
alone for eternity.2 Yet the law of philanthropy—the collection of state
and federal rules shaping charitable giving by large philanthropic
organizations—stubbornly insists on building and preserving
institutions to carry out the wishes of their founders not just for a few
1.
PRINCE & THE REVOLUTION, Let’s Go Crazy, on PURPLE RAIN (Warner Bros.
Records 1984).
2.
See, e.g., Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias, in THE ART OF THE SONNET 125, 125–29
(Stephen Burt & David Mikics eds., 2010).

2021]

AGENCY COSTS OF FOREVER PHILANTHROPY

759

years, but “in perpetuity.”3 Federal tax law offers charitable donors
powerful incentives to donate to a grantmaking organization they
control now, but to forestall actually distributing the money to support
active charities for as long as possible.4 State law protects donor
prerogatives to delay grantmaking, and about fifteen states actually
penalize grantmakers who spend too fast.5
Philanthropy and its timing have become major hot-button
issues in recent years, in part due to the rise in global wealth
inequality.6 Mass-market authors, such as Anand Giridharadas,
criticize the ways in which global elites stash vast sums in grantmaking
organizations and use them as tools for amassing social influence, all
while not doing much in the way of actually funding real charity.7
Academics, including me, my erstwhile colleague Ray Madoff, and the
Stanford political scientist Rob Reich, have all suggested that there is
a fundamental mismatch between the resources society devotes to
supporting philanthropy and the ways in which “perpetual”
grantmakers actually deploy those resources.8 For instance, it is quite
possible for a foundation donor to claim a charitable contribution
deduction of billions of dollars while never allocating a single dollar of
those funds for grants.9

3.
Brian Galle, Pay It Forward? Law and the Problem of Restricted-Spending Philanthropy,
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (2016).
4.
David M. Schizer, Charitable Subsidies and Nonprofit Governance: Comparing the
Charitable Deduction with the Exemption for Endowment Income, 71 TAX L. REV. 665, 689–
94 (2018).
5.
Susan N. Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts: Public Benefit, Public Voice, 81 ALB. L. REV.
565, 607 (2018); Galle, supra note 3, at 1200 n.281; Daniel Halperin, Tax Policy and Endowments—
Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized?, 67 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 17, 22 (2011).
6.
See NAT’L COMM. FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, CRITERIA FOR PHILANTHROPY AT ITS
BEST 84 (2009) (“Payout has been a frequent subject of debate and continuing dialogue within the
philanthropic field.”). Debate about philanthropic wealth and its uses is of course not a new
phenomenon. See Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 899–944 (1997) (discussing how the debate evolved through the
twentieth century).
7.
ANAND GIRIDHARADAS, WINNERS TAKE ALL: THE ELITE CHARADE OF CHANGING THE
WORLD 53, 164–65, 182 (2018); see DAVID CALLAHAN, THE GIVERS: WEALTH, POWER, AND
PHILANTHROPY IN A NEW GILDED AGE 235–60 (2017) (describing modern philanthropists as “the
new Medicis”).
8.
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.4, at 713–14 (9th ed. 2014); Galle,
supra note 3, at 1159–81; ROB REICH, JUST GIVING 90–93, 144–49 (2018); Ray Madoff & Rob Reich,
Now or Forever: Rethinking Foundation Life Spans, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Mar. 30, 2016),
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Opinion-Now-or-Forever-/235896 [https://perma.cc/RB36WFGK].
9.
See John E. Core & Thomas Donaldson, An Economic and Ethical Approach to Charity
and Charity Endowments, 68 REV. SOC. ECON. 261, 265 (2010) (explaining that when charitable
distributions are smaller than real growth of charitable assets, organization never need to spend
the principal).
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The recent COVID-19 crisis has drawn even greater attention to
the tightfistedness of many philanthropic organizations. Pointing to the
urgent need for fiscal and public-health interventions, many
commentators have urged philanthropists to open their wallets.10
Recent estimates suggest traditional philanthropies hold upwards of $1
trillion in assets.11 Yet it made major news when five—not five hundred,
five—of the thousands of American foundations announced plans to
increase their annual planned spending.12
Although state and federal taxpayers massively underwrite
philanthropic giving, the laws authorizing that support have
surprisingly little to say about how quickly the money is spent. As
readers likely know, individuals who give to charitable organizations
get an income-tax deduction, and donated funds are also exempt from
estate and gift taxes.13 Investments held by charities are exempt from
any further tax as well, and because of this rule the government’s
contribution to a gift grows larger the longer an organization holds it.14
Taken together, as Ray Madoff and I have described elsewhere, these
benefits can represent an effective matching grant of 70% or more of the
value of a gift.15
In exchange, some but not all organizations pledge to spend a
certain minimum fraction of their resources each year. Traditional
grantmakers are mostly categorized by the tax code as “private
foundations.”16 That status requires them to pay out roughly 5% of their

10. Benjamin Soskis, Amid the Covid-19 Crisis, Foundations Should Stop Treating the 5%
Payout as Holy Writ, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.philanthropy.com/
article/Amid-the-Covid-19-Crisis/248374 [https://perma.cc/P4H7-9AB5]; Paul Sullivan, How
Philanthropists Are Helping During the Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/your-money/philanthropy-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/
8EFW-Z7M6]; COVID-19 Exposes American Philanthropy’s Strengths and Weaknesses,
ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/04/27/covid-19exposes-american-philanthropys-strengths-and-weaknesses [https://perma.cc/U6DU-9BRF].
11. Maria Di Mento, Foundation Assets Top $1 Trillion, but Signs Point to Slump, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Foundation-Assets-Top1/246975 [https://perma.cc/5FTY-9468]; see Aggregate Fiscal Data of Foundations in the U.S.,
2015, FOUND. CTR., http://data.foundationcenter.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
XC2K-NG6L] (showing that assets held by foundations in the U.S. was near $1 trillion in 2015).
12. James B. Stewart & Nicholas Kulish, Leading Foundations Pledge to Give More,
Hoping to Upend Philanthropy, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/business/fordfoundation-bonds-coronavirus.html (last updated June 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/CU8H-XC39].
13. I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055.
14. Id. § 501(c)(3); see Halperin, supra note 5, at 18 (explaining how tax exemptions impact
the growth of endowments).
15. Brian Galle & Ray Madoff, The Myth of Payout Rules: Where Do We Go from Here?, in
GIVING IN TIME (Benjamin Soskis ed., forthcoming) (manuscript at 3–4) (on file with author).
16. See Roger Colinvaux, Defending Place-Based Philanthropy by Defining the Community
Foundation, 2018 BYU L. REV. 1, 8–16 (describing legal categories for grantmaking organizations).
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investment assets annually in grants and other charitable activity.17
Even this low number has some important loopholes.18 Active charities,
such as universities, usually face no requirement at all.19
Because of a quirk in how “private foundation” is defined, some
grantmakers also escape from that definition, and so are free from any
payout requirement.20 Beginning in the early 1990s, the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) gave its approval to so-called “commercial
donor-advised fund sponsoring organizations,” or what I’ll call DSOs
(often known by the shorthand term “donor-advised fund” or “DAF”).21
A DSO is a kind of condominium of private foundations, with one
organization managing investments and administration for many
individual donor accounts.22 Commercial DSOs took a while to catch on,
but have shown massive growth since 2010, exceeding $120 billion in
assets on hand as of 2018.23 IRS data suggest that roughly one-fifth of
DSOs averaged a payout rate of zero—as in no dollars spent at all—
during the period for which the IRS had information available.24 DSOs
also create several key loopholes in the regulatory regime for private
foundations.25 For instance, a foundation can potentially satisfy its
minimum distribution requirement by moving money to an account at
a DSO, then transferring those funds back again.
Though modest and loophole riddled, the minimum payout rule
for private foundations has become intensely controversial. A group of
self-described “patriotic billionaires” is pressing Congress to double the
minimum amount, even as many pillars of the nonprofit world press in
the opposite direction.26
Some have framed this debate as a question of intergenerational
justice. Payout rules offer a counterbalance to legal and other forces

17. I.R.C. § 4942(e).
18. Galle & Madoff, supra note 15 (manuscript at 6–10).
19. I.R.C. § 509(a).
20. Colinvaux, supra note 16, at 52–53.
21. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS
AND DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 21–22 (2011) (providing an overview on DSOs).
22. Id.
23. NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, 2019 DONOR-ADVISED FUND REPORT 10 (2019).
24. Paul Arnsberger, Donor-Advised Funds: An Overview Using IRS Data, in THE RISE OF
DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS: SHOULD CONGRESS RESPOND? 61, 67 fig.D (2015).
25. Johnny Rex Buckles, Should the Private Foundation Excise Tax on Failure to Distribute
Income Generally Apply to “Private Foundation Substitutes”? Evaluating the Taxation of Various
Models of Charitable Entities, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 493, 521–38 (2010); Colinvaux, supra note 16,
at 52–53; Galle, supra note 3, at 1198–1200.
26. Stewart & Kulish, supra note 12; Michael Kavate, Inside the Foundation Payout Debate:
How Crisis and Opportunity Are Forcing Change, INSIDE PHILANTHROPY (June 19, 2020),
https://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2020/6/19/for-decades-foundations-have-given-theminimum-required-that-may-be-changing [https://perma.cc/8VNM-BCFP].
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that favor low spending.27 By spending little, an organization stands a
better chance of stretching those dollars forever. It could be argued,
then, that one’s views on payout should depend at least in part on
whether one believes philanthropy should exist for today or instead for
tomorrow, and whether current taxpayers should underwrite benefits
for humans who have yet to be born.28
In my view, though, the core of the debate is an empirical one.
Payout defenders can grant that it might be wise to transfer wealth
from today to tomorrow, but still question whether subsidizing
philanthropic organizations with no payout requirement is the best or
the wisest way to undertake that transfer.29
One key open empirical question is the extent to which
organizations’ managers abide by the wishes of their supporters.
Payout defenders argue that payout rules help to mitigate what they
call the “dead hand” problem.30 This is the idea that, once an initial
funder is no longer around to control her organization, the new
managers will no longer serve the mission she had in mind and may
instead spend scarce charitable dollars on their goals or even their own
comfort. An economist might say that “agency costs,” or the gaps
between what a principal desires and what her agents accomplish, are
vastly larger in long-lived organizations.31
That makes some theoretical sense, but how big is this problem,
really? Is it actually the case, for instance, that managers will feather
their own nests instead of making grants? After all, the managers who
run charities are . . . charitable. Don’t they want to do the most good for
the most people? Some of the most renowned scholars in the fields of
managerial studies and nonprofit theory argue on these and related
grounds that agency costs at charitable organizations are low.32
27. Galle, supra note 3, at 1185–92.
28. Compare Michael Klausner, When Time Isn’t Money: Foundation Payouts and the Time
Value of Money, 1 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 51, 52–59 (2003) (arguing that the policy should
not prefer spending today over tomorrow, at least if on the basis of “pure time preferences”), with
Core & Donaldson, supra note 9, at 281 & n.18 (arguing that intergenerational equity argument
is internally inconsistent and neglects importance of community connections), and Henry
Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 14–16 (1990) (arguing
that future generations will be wealthier than present and do not deserve additional transfers).
29. Galle, supra note 3, at 1156–59; see also Hansmann, supra note 28, at 18 (questioning
whether university endowment would be the appropriate method for transferring resources to
the future).
30. Galle, supra note 3, at 1162; Lester M. Salamon, Foundations as Investment Managers
Part 1: The Process, 3 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 117, 118 (1992) (providing a historical
background for the payout requirement); Schizer, supra note 4, at 695–98.
31. Hansmann, supra note 28, at 33.
32. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims,
26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 344–45 (1983) (finding low agency costs for nonprofits); Myron J. Roomkin &
Burton A. Weisbrod, Managerial Compensation and Incentives in For-Profit and Nonprofit
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In this Essay, I present new evidence on agency costs in
philanthropic organizations. Drawing on two large databases of private
foundation fiscal and other information, I show marked differences in
the behaviors of foundations with living donors and those whose donors
are all deceased. Overhead ratios, or the share of firm expenditures
devoted to salaries and administration, increase slightly as the number
of living donors diminishes and then jump by 10% as soon as the last
living donor dies. Similarly, payout rates drop in the first couple of
years after the last living donor passes, then fall quickly to the 5%
minimum for the remaining observable years of the foundation. Other
writers have found a correlation between the age of a charity and its
spending rate.33 My unique contribution is that, given the relatively
random timing of the donor’s death, I am able to argue that these
changes are caused directly by the death of the donor and not some
other factor that happens to correlate with the age of the charity.
Both these results, I argue, are evidence of important agency
costs. Each shows that, as soon as there are no donors around to
influence an organization’s behavior, the firm’s managers behave quite
differently. I confirm prior findings that donors dislike overhead costs,
including some of my own work reporting that overhead is lower when
donors have the power to sue a charity’s managers.34 As far as I know,
this is the first published work to report important differences in
spending patterns between firms with living donors and firms without.
These results thus supply some new reasons to be supportive of
payout rules and skeptical of efforts to slow spending, such as through
loose federal regulation of DSOs. All else equal, a donated dollar spent
today rather than after the donor’s death will have a higher social
Hospitals, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 750, 751–52 (1999) (suggesting that nonprofit firms use
compensation structures to select managers who are not motivated by money and do not need close
monitoring to prevent diversion of funds); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and
Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 701, 716 (1996) [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman, Altruism]
(suggesting that ideological commitment helps to overcome agency problems in some nonprofits);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Ideals Versus Dollars: Donors, Charity Managers, and Government Grants,
95 J. POL. ECON. 810, 812 (1987) (hypothesizing that people without financial incentives are more
likely to pursue positions as nonprofit managers).
33. Richard Sansing & Robert Yetman, Governing Private Foundations Using the Tax Law,
41 J. ACCT. & ECON. 363, 376–77 (2006). Others similarly find that foundations that have not
received recent gifts spend at close to the minimum statutory level. Timothy R. Yoder & Brian P.
McAllister, Do Private Foundations Increase Current Distributions to Qualify for a 50 Percent Tax
Rate Reduction?, 34 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 45, 47 (2012); Lester M. Salamon, Foundations as
Investment Managers Part II: The Performance, 3 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 239, 248–
50 (1993).
34. Brian Galle, Valuing the Right to Sue: An Empirical Examination of Nonprofit Agency
Costs, 60 J.L. & ECON. 413, 428–30 (2017); Uri Gneezy, Elizabeth A. Keenan & Ayelet Gneezy,
Avoiding Overhead Aversion in Charity, 346 SCIENCE 632, 633 (2014); Daniel Tinkelman & Kamini
Mankaney, When Is Administrative Efficiency Associated with Charitable Donations?, 36
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 41, 56–57 (2007).
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return, because it will better satisfy the donor’s preferences. To be clear,
though my evidence is only on how managers and donors differ with
respect to overhead and payout, my claim is broader: these divergences
are only symptoms of a larger underlying problem. Donors cannot
control their foundation effectively after they are dead, and this will be
evidenced not only in the easily measured outcomes I report but also in
others that might be even more important to donors—such as choices
about which causes to support.
The results have implications for state laws, as well. As I
mentioned already, more than a dozen states presume charity
managers act unlawfully when they spend the organization’s money too
quickly. Nearly every state presumes that, unless a donor expressly
says otherwise, she intends for any donation subject to conditions or
restrictions to also be subject to the implied limitation that the gift be
used “in perpetuity.”35 And important accounting rules force nonprofit
managers to act as though foundation money has to be preserved
forever.36 All these rules appear contrary to the observed preferences of
donors and instead reflect the desires of professional nonprofit
managers. That is understandable as a political economy matter, but it
probably does not reflect ideal policy.
Finally, my findings could justify new thinking about the ways
in which governments incentivize giving. Tax and other policies should
favor “giving while living” over perpetually endowed philanthropic
organizations. I will argue that this justifies higher payout
requirements as well as a larger estate tax that applies to more estates.
To the extent that individuals accidentally leave behind charitable
estates, rules that encourage faster spending during the donor’s life
would also help to improve the return on our investments in the
charitable sector.
In Part I of this Essay, I will set out some additional theoretical
background for readers new to this topic and review prior empirical
findings that touch on aspects of my work here. Part II explains my data
sources and the construction of key variables. In Part III, I examine the
impact of donor death on payout and overhead ratios, using both
graphical and regression analyses. Part IV considers what we can infer
35. Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent
Management of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1305–07, 1311 (2007).
36. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FASB STAFF POSITION NO. 117-1, ENDOWMENTS OF NOT-FORPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, at app. ¶¶ A12–13 (Aug. 6, 2008), https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/
Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1218220134971&acceptedDisclaimer=true
[https://perma.cc/
8MNQ-QV2R]. For evidence that accounting constraints are important drivers of foundation
behavior, see Brian Galle, Why Do Foundations Follow the Law? Evidence from Adoption of the
Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 36 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 532,
551–52 (2017).
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from my findings and discusses policy implications for the law of
philanthropy as well as the estate and gift tax regime. I then conclude.
I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE
A. Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving: Details and Rationales
Federal tax law provides several distinct benefits for charitable
contributors.37 Among these are charitable contribution deductions
from income and estate taxes, exclusions from the gift tax and income
tax on gifts of appreciated assets, and the ability to deduct the full fair
market value of noncash property.38 A back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that for high net-worth individuals, these rules in combination
can produce in excess of $7 million worth of return value on a $10
million gift.39
Why does Congress provide such generous tax benefits for
charitable giving? The prevailing view is that subsidies make up for two

37.
38.

This Part I.A draws extensively on Galle & Madoff, supra note 15.
Evelyn Brody, Reforming Tax Policy with Respect to Charitable Organizations, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW 484, 484–86 (Matthew Harding ed., 2018).
39. A useful overview of these benefits and how the wealthy maximize them is MYRON S.
SCHOLES, MARK A WOLFSON, MERLE M. ERICKSON, EDWARD L. MAYDEW & TERRENCE J. SHEVLIN,
TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 485–502 (5th ed. 2016). The first benefit
is an income tax deduction. Setting aside some technical detail, a charitable contribution reduces
the donor’s taxable income, which in turn saves her an actual number of dollars equal to the
donation amount times her “marginal” tax rate, which is the rate she pays on the last dollar of
income. For instance, since the current top tax rate is 37%, a $10 million donation reduces a donor’s
tax paid by $3.7 million.
In addition, two separate rules combine to provide extremely favorable treatment for donations
of property that have appreciated in value since acquired. First, although taxpayers usually must
include such gains in income when property is “sold or otherwise disposed of,” donations to charity
do not trigger this rule—in technical lingo, a donation is not a “realization event.” Second, and
subject to some important exceptions, donations of property provide a charitable contribution
deduction in the amount of the full fair market value of the property.
Finally, charitable contributions are not subject to the gift tax and also reduce the estate
tax. At current estate and gift tax rates of 40%, this produces $4 million of savings on a $10
million gift.
Taken together, then, a donor who establishes a private foundation with a new $10 million
contribution of appreciated, publicly traded stock can save up to $7.7 million in current and
expected taxes. The initial donation creates $3.7 million in income tax savings. Assuming that
none of the value of the stock has yet been taxed, its transfer saves the donor another 23.8% x $10
million = roughly $2.4 million in potential capital gains taxes. And that $10 million will neither be
taxed at the time of donor’s death nor subject to the gift tax. Assuming estate taxes are only being
saved on the value of the contributed assets net of taxes that would have been paid (which would
be $3.9 million assuming the donor had paid the additional $3.7 million and $2.4 million in taxes),
this would still save an additional $1.6 million (40% of 3.9 million). Adding these up, the creation
of a $10 million private foundation could save the donor (and effectively cost the government) up
to $7.7 million. Cf. id. at 499 (modeling effective tax rate on charitable gifts and estimating subsidy
rates in the 70% range, depending on statutory rates).
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market failures, one economic, one political.40 Despite our best
intentions, most humans remain at least somewhat self-interested. We
therefore are usually unwilling to pay fully for benefits that accrue to
other people—what an economist would call “positive externalities.”
Many goods, once purchased by one person, provide additional spillover
benefits to others, so that no one individual has an incentive to provide
as much as would be ideal from a social perspective. Examples here
include public parks, museums, and medical research. By offering
tax benefits, Congress hopes that we can be motivated through
selfish considerations to purchase more of the positive-externality
goods, moving society closer to the level it would choose if not for the
market’s failure.41
Of course, taxing and spending is another way to cure market
failures, and so the second failure that rationalizes charity is
government failure.42 A single national government could meet the
demands of the majority voter, but would sometimes leave unsatisfied
those who wanted more or different goods than the majority prefer.
Subsidies for charity are, in essence, a version of private federalism,
dividing the atom of sovereignty by handing over some of the federal
budget for allocation by donors and the managers they hire. In an ideal
world, this has the potential to promote diverse and pluralistic
responses to the world’s ills. 43
Congress has established a fairly dense set of rules governing
which entities are eligible to receive subsidized gifts. These limits are
aimed at ensuring that money goes to its intended purposes—generally,
providing goods that the private market alone would struggle to
deliver.44 For example, an eligible organization must be organized and
operated for one or more exempt purposes.45
Congress also distinguishes among eligible organizations, most
notably in the division between “public charities” and “private
40. Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a ThreeSector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171, 175–77 (Edmund S. Phelps
ed., 1975). On the prevalence of this “dual failure” theory, see, for example, JOHN D. COLOMBO &
MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 100–08 (1995); and Miranda Perry Fleischer,
Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
505, 520 (2010).
41. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393,
1396–1407 (1988).
42. Weisbrod, supra note 40, at 175–77.
43. A problem with this account is that federalism itself also has these features, raising the
question what additional role charity might play. I consider this question in (much) more detail
elsewhere. Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777, 790–
835 (2012).
44. Id. at 788.
45. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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foundations.”46 To simplify a bit, tax law defines a public charity as an
organization that derives most of its revenues from a wide base of
donors or charitable-service revenues, while a private foundation gets
its money from just a few individuals. Schools, hospitals, and churches
are always public charities no matter their financing.47 Gifts to public
charities are treated a little more favorably than are gifts to private
foundations.48 Private foundations must also comply with a slightly
more onerous set of governance rules, and they pay a modest tax, a bit
more than 1%, on their net investment earnings.49
More relevantly for our purposes, among the special rules
applicable to private foundations is the requirement that they make
regular distributions, or “payouts.” Each year, a private foundation
computes 5% of the net value of its investment assets.50 It then has until
the end of the following year to spend that amount on “qualifying
distributions,” which can include grants to other charities.51 Failure to
meet the deadline triggers a hefty penalty.52 Notably, administrative
expenses count against this minimum, and they can include reasonable
compensation to, and travel costs for the benefit of, family members of
the donor.53 Several other major avenues for philanthropic giving, such
as donor-advised funds and so-called “supporting organizations,” do not
face any similar payout obligation.54
B. The Payout Debate
If the charitable sector is intended to hand the keys of publicgoods production over to private operators, what explains rules, like the
payout requirement, that tell nonprofits how to do their job? While this
debate has become quite intricate, and its particulars vary depending
46. Buckles, supra note 25, at 497–98; see I.R.C. § 509(a) (laying out generally the definition
of a private foundation).
47. I.R.C. § 509(a)(1).
48. Id. §§ 170(b)(1)(D), (e)(1)(B)(ii), (e)(5).
49. Dana Brakman Reiser, Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, the Limited Liability
Company, and the Millionaire Next Door, 70 FLA. L. REV. 921, 932–47 (2018); see I.R.C. §§ 49404945 (setting out special excise taxes for private foundations).
50. The exact calculation is somewhat more intricate than the description in the main text—
this is tax law, after all. For details, see Buckles, supra note 25, at 503–05. For added detail on the
history of the payout requirement, see NAT’L COMM. FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, supra note
6, at 84–87; and Daniel Halperin, Tax Policy and Endowments—Is Excessive Accumulation
Subsidized? (Part II), 67 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 125, 126–28 (2011).
51. Foundations can also, with IRS permission, save up over multiple years for a single large grant.
I.R.C. § 4942.
52. Id. § 4942(a).
53. Id. § 4942(g)(1)(A).
54. Colinvaux, supra note 16, at 52–53. Certain supporting organizations do have a payout
requirement, but it is generally smaller. Buckles, supra note 25, at 507–08.
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on whether we are discussing grantmaking organizations or active
endowed institutions such as universities, I will try to sketch the
general contours of the argument. My focus in the discussion, as in my
data, will be on grantmaking organizations.
Payout rules, or something else like them, are arguably
necessary in order to achieve neutrality because our tax system strongly
encourages early gifts and delayed spending. As Dan Halperin has
shown, because charities are exempt from taxes on investment income,
donors have strong incentives to contribute money to charities earlier
than they otherwise would prefer.55 In effect, the donor makes use of
the charity’s exemption to make a larger (after-tax) gift.56 This
multiplier effect grows larger the longer the donor’s gift is able to
compound tax free.57 Similarly, donors strongly prefer giving money to
charity at the time of their death, rather than leaving cash to their heirs
for later donation.58 The former allows donors to both enjoy the charity’s
tax exemption for longer and escape the estate tax.59 These two benefits
compound each other since the extra donated funds that escape the
estate tax also get to grow tax free.
The result is that donors have powerful incentives to turn money
over to nonprofit managers for long stretches of time, which in turn
likely reduces the degree to which donors can influence the firm. A
standard way in which funders control their agents is through “staged
financing.”60 Staged financing allows the funder to demand satisfactory
performance in period one before the agent can receive another round
of funding in period two.61 Without this source of leverage, the agent
might opportunistically use the funder’s money for her own purposes,
such as taking a payment to sit on a beach sipping mai tais.62 Research

55. Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283,
287–88, 306–08 (2011).
56. Id. at 288, 307; see Hansmann, supra note 28, at 20 (making this point informally).
57. Halperin, supra note 55, at 305, 308.
58. See Michael J. Brunetti, The Estate Tax and Charitable Bequests: Elasticity Estimates
Using Probate Records, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 165, 168–69, 176–78 (2005) (summarizing prior studies
and reporting new evidence that price-elasticity of charitable giving out of estates is about -1.3).
But see Steven A. Hanke, Ted D. Englebrecht, Hui Di & Timothy Bisping, A Two-State Analysis of
Estate Taxes and Charitable Bequests from the Most Generous Decedents, 28 ADVANCES ACCT. 38,
46–48 (2012) (not finding tax rate to have statistically significant effects on charitable bequests).
59. I.R.C. § 2055.
60. Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital,
50 J. FIN. 1461, 1464 (1995). For a cogent explanation in the nonprofit context, see Schizer, supra
note 4, at 695–98.
61. Gompers, supra note 60, at 1461–62.
62. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986); for evidence that leisure is an important goal for managers,
see Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance

2021]

AGENCY COSTS OF FOREVER PHILANTHROPY

769

in the for-profit setting finds that an agent who has access to “free cash
flows,” or money that is not conditioned on her satisfactory
performance, exhibits considerably more opportunistic behavior and
rather less effective performance.63
In short, the tax treatment of charity creates agency costs. When
there is a separation of ownership and control—when agents have
unconstrained use of their principals’ money—agents will often serve
their own interests, not those of the principal.64 It is of course possible
to reduce an agent’s chances for opportunistic behavior through means
other than staged financing, and indeed this is largely the function of
the law of organizations.65 But drafting organizational documents, and
especially monitoring and enforcing compliance with them, is itself a
costly endeavor.66 Nonprofit law compounds this problem by barring
most donors from suing to challenge managerial decisions, leaving it to
state attorneys general to act on behalf of an organization’s supporters
and beneficiaries.67
Where do payout rules figure in this story? A payout
requirement accelerates the flow of dollars out of the hands of
managers, reducing the amount and duration of free cash under their
control. It thus works to offset some of the incentives for delayed
spending that tax rules create.68 Of course, we could just undo those tax
rules, as Congress recently did in imposing a small, new tax on the
investment earnings of colleges and universities.69 But while raising
and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1044, 1058 (2003). For evidence that mai tais
are delicious, see your nearest bartender.
63. E.g., Olivier Jean Blanchard, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Do
Firms Do with Cash Windfalls?, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 337, 352, 355, 358 (1994); Jensen, supra note 62,
at 323, 325–29; see also Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction, in THE GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 1, 12–17, 20–23 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2003) (explaining that free cash flows
reduce responsiveness of university employees to outside influences).
64. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 302–24 (1983). For application to charities, see Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff,
Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 779 (2008). The argument traces back to ADAM SMITH, 2 THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 282–302 (E. Cannan ed. 1976) (1776).
65. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 41 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2008).
66. Gompers, supra note 60, at 1464.
67. Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1429 (1998);
Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 601 (1981).
68. Galle, supra note 3, at 1153, 1185.
69. I.R.C. § 4968. For a detailed explanation of the rationales for taxing university
endowments, see Halperin, supra note 5, at 17–25; Sarah E. Waldeck, The Coming Showdown over
University Endowments: Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795, 1817–22 (2009); Edward
A. Zelinsky, Section 4968 and Taxing All Charitable Endowments: A Critique and a Proposal, 38
VA. TAX REV. 141, 166–74 (2018). As Halperin observes, one could offset any reduction in giving
that results from a tax by providing offsetting benefits to charity of other kinds. Halperin, supra
note 50, at 131.
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taxes on charities might help to reduce timing distortions, it also might
have the unwanted side effect of reducing the net dollars available for
the charities’ missions.70 Payout rules potentially offer a route to
mitigating timing distortions without reducing charity resources.71
The urgency of payout requirements thus relates directly to the
importance of agency costs. Suppose that the agency costs of some set
of charities were very modest: despite the opportunity for self-dealing,
managers rarely ignored donor preferences. This might be the case if
managers and donors are unusually aligned in their preferences, or if
there exists some very effective “technology” (a really easily enforced
contract, say) for monitoring managers. If that were true, the agencycost case for payout rules would be much weaker.
Another common argument against payout rules is that slower
spending is actually good.72 In this account, society has an obligation to
share its current resources equally with future generations.73 Allowing
investment returns to accumulate inside a grantmaking organization is
said to satisfy this obligation better than actually making grants, since
financial returns are generally higher than the overall rate of economic
growth in the economy.74
I have argued that there are many, many problems with this
75
story. Among others, it neglects the likelihood that immediate
spending itself has compounding returns and that these returns are
likely to exceed the average financial return a philanthropy could
earn.76 Another gap in this anti-payout account is that it ignores agency
70. NAT’L COMM. FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, supra note 6, at 85 (noting that this
argument is the reason Congress initially enacted a minimum payout requirement instead of a tax
on endowments). It is possible that taxes do not reduce charity resources, though. For example,
donors could respond to a tax on charities by giving more.
71. See Galle, supra note 3, at 1192–95 (considering the choice between minimum payout
rules and investment taxes).
72. PAUL BREST & HAL HARVEY, MONEY WELL SPENT: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SMART
PHILANTHROPY 262–66 (2008); JOEL L. FLEISHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET
236–48 (2007); Carl J. Schramm, Law Outside the Market: The Social Utility of the Private
Foundation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 355, 398–407 (2006).
73. Klausner, supra note 28, at 52, 58; see James Tobin, What Is Permanent Endowment
Income?, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 427, 427 (1974) (describing this possible view without clearly
endorsing it).
74. Klausner, supra note 28, at 52.
75. Galle, supra note 3, at 1159–81.
76. Id. at 1159–60; see Core & Donaldson, supra note 9, at 269 n.11 (observing that spending
may also generate compound returns); see also Schizer, supra note 4, at 702 (making this point
about operating charities); Hansmann, supra note 28, at 18 (making this point about university
endowment). But see Halperin, supra note 5, at 20 (agreeing with Klausner that some charitable
acts, such as feeding the hungry, may be equally valuable no matter when performed). I agree that
there may be some expenditures that do not have compounding returns, or returns that compound
only very slowly. What is unclear is why Congress would want to subsidize the inefficient hoarding
of wealth when higher-return options are available. Cf. Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 64, at 755 (“It
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costs. Turning money over to foundation managers to hold for
generations adds an extra and potentially costly layer of agency costs.
If we are comparing the relative social return to immediate versus
delayed spending, these costs have to be subtracted from the net payoff
of long-lived philanthropy.77
Thus, there are several reasons that it is important for us to
understand the magnitude and nature of agency costs at philanthropic
institutions. The larger these costs, the stronger the argument for a
payout rule or other policies to encourage immediate expenditures.
C. Agency Costs in Philanthropic Firms
What, then, do we know about agency costs in grantmaking
organizations? An optimistic take might draw on “stewardship theory”
or related ideas to suggest that costs are low.78 In this view, nonprofit
managers are not particularly opportunistic because they share a lot of
their donors’ goals and values.79 The nonprofit manager chose to work
in philanthropy because that is what she is passionate about, and she
is not going to waste resources on other goals.80 Firms can write
contracts that help them screen for individuals who are committed to
mission, not pay or perquisites.81
That is surely true of many foundation managers, but managers
are also human. Humans may prefer the easy and the measurable over
the difficult and the abstract.82 For instance, one survey reported that
managers favor accumulation because they can see it.83 While many
is hardly obvious that a trust with so large a corpus and so small a mission warrants the tax
subsidy.”). An appropriately modest planner would also discount future payoffs from acts like
feeding the poor by the possibility that these acts may not be as valuable in the future, or that the
organization holding assets may not exist or no longer be the most effective way of delivering the
service. Core & Donaldson, supra note 9, at 273; Hansmann, supra note 28, at 16. If, however,
there is a possibility that future beneficiaries will be even worse off than we now expect, that might
be an argument for greater savings. Core & Donaldson, supra note 9, at 273.
77. Cf. Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 873, 930–35 (1997) (explaining that spend vs. save decisions should depend on comparison
of financial returns to net social payoff from spending); Klausner, supra note 28, at 55–57 (same).
78. See sources cited supra note 32. The label “stewardship theory” appears to originate in
Stijn Van Puyvelde, Ralf Caers, Cind Du Bois & Marc Jegers, The Governance of Nonprofit
Organizations: Integrating Agency Theory with Stakeholder and Stewardship Theories, 41
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 431, 435–36 (2012).
79. E.g., Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, supra note 32, at 719–20.
80. Id.
81. Fama & Jensen, supra note 32, at 344–45.
82. See Daniel Tversky & Amos Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163, 164–65 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (summarizing results of ten studies).
83. Akash Deep & Peter Frumkin, The Foundation Payout Puzzle, in TAKING PHILANTHROPY
SERIOUSLY 189, 199 (William Damon & Susan Verducci eds., 2006). Reportedly, the study was
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managers are undoubtedly motivated by a desire to do good, outside
their preferred sphere they may not fully take into account the
consequences their decisions might have for others.84 For example, not
all managers will strive to fail spectacularly in ways that will provide
useful lessons for others, even though this is actually an important
benefit that risky grantmaking provides to the world at large.85
Managers also are unlikely to be totally ignorant of their own
self-interest.86 Foundation employment is good, steady work. The
manager’s reputation is a personal asset that she cannot easily
diversify.87 Thus, it is in managers’ self-interest to take few risks with
the finances or reputation of their organization.88 This is even more
evident for managers with close ties to for-profit operations that can
profit from holding assets under management, such as in the
commercial DSO industry. Reputation and personal reward can also be
tied to asset accumulation.89
We have little direct evidence to settle these potential
disagreements,90 but what we do have is suggestive that agency costs
inspired by speculation in Hansmann, supra note 28, at 37, that nonprofit board members might
focus on financial returns because they are more measurable.
84. Sung Min Park & Jessica Word, Serving the Mission: Organizational Antecedents and
Social Consequences of Job Choice Motivation in the Nonprofit Sector, 17 INT’L REV. PUB. ADMIN.
169, 187–90 (2012) (finding that charitable sector workers are motivated by a mix of altruistic and
self-benefitting motives, but that women are more motivated by mission than men); see also Brian
Galle & David I. Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Problem: Evidence from U.S.
Colleges and Universities, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1881, 1895–97 (2014) (arguing that even altruistic
managers optimize tradeoffs between mission and purely self-serving decisions, that marginal
contribution of a decision to the latter is often much larger than to the former, and showing
evidence of this phenomenon in higher education).
85. Galle, supra note 3, at 1159–60.
86. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 844, 875, 878
(1980); see James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of WarmGlow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464–65 (1990) (arguing that even pure altruists free ride on others’
efforts); Raymond Fisman & R. Glenn Hubbard, The Role of Nonprofit Endowments, in THE
GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 63, at 217, 218–23 (arguing that
endowments allow for managerial opportunism).
87. See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation
and Incentives: A Survey, ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 33 (making this point about
executives generally).
88. Core & Donaldson, supra note 9, at 280; see also Hansmann, supra note 28, at 36 (noting
this incentive in a variety of charitable organizations).
89. Howard P. Tuckman & Cyril F. Chang, Nonprofit Equity: A Behavioral Model and Its
Policy Implications, 11 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 76, 78–79, 85–86 (1992) (reporting evidence
that managers accumulate endowment for their own personal reward); Halperin, supra note 5, at
19 (discussing how endowment size can benefit universities); Hansmann, supra note 28, at 38.
90. See Ralf Caers, Cindy Du Bois, Marc Jegers, Sara De Gieter, Catherine Schepers &
Roland Pepermans, Principal-Agent Relationships on the Stewardship-Agency Axis, 17 NONPROFIT
MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 25, 30–32 (2006) (explaining that evidence does not conclusively resolve the
debate between “stewardship” and agency cost models of nonprofit management); Klick & Sitkoff,
supra note 64, at 756 n.36, 783 (observing that at the time there were no quantitative studies of
agency costs in charitable trusts).
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still matter. Several papers find that even for operating charities, where
managers are involved in on-the-ground service to beneficiaries,
statistical measures of agency cost are rather higher in settings where
monitoring is incrementally more difficult.91 For instance, David
Walker and I find that when university presidents show up on a list of
the “Top 10 Most Highly Compensated,” donations to their university—
and the growth rate of the president’s pay—drop afterwards.92 This
implies that donors dislike excessive pay, but have a hard time
monitoring for it unless some publication produces an easy-to-read
comparative list.93 And, absent that ready monitoring, executive
compensation grows very quickly. As in some for-profits, nonprofit
compensation is strongly correlated with free cash flows.94
Similarly, in prior work I find evidence that changes in
monitoring processes result in changes in measurable agency costs. In
particular, when state legislatures give donors the right to sue a donee
private foundation, overhead (defined as the share of an organization’s
budget that is not spent directly on its charitable mission) and executive
compensation at the foundation fall on average between 5% and 10%.95
A trio of accounting professors find that large endowments among
operating charities (i.e., not the foundations I study) are correlated with
high overhead ratios.96
We should not place too much weight on one or two papers.
Among other potential issues, my finding on the right to sue could not
wholly rule out the possibility that the results were caused not by the
right to sue itself, but instead by other components of the legislation
that states usually enacted together with that change.97 There are a
number of potentially innocuous explanations for why overhead would

91. Mihir A. Desai & Robert J. Yetman, Constraining Managers Without Owners: Governance
of the Not-for-Profit Enterprise, 4 J. GOVERNMENTAL & NONPROFIT ACCT. 53, 67–69 (2015);
Raymond Fisman & R. Glenn Hubbard, Precautionary Savings and the Governance of Nonprofit
Organizations, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 2231, 2240–41 (2005); see also Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 64, at
757 (reporting evidence of large waste of value by managers of the Milton Hershey Charitable
Trust, which operates the Milton Hershey School and owns a controlling share of the eponymous
chocolate company).
92. Brian Galle & David I. Walker, Donor Reaction to Salient Disclosures of Nonprofit
Executive Pay: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach, 45 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 787,
794–97 (2016).
93. Id. at 797.
94. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Rodrigo S. Verdi, Agency Problems of Excess Endowment
Holdings in Not-for-Profit Firms, 41 J. ACCT. & ECON. 307, 325–29 (2006); Galle & Walker, supra
note 84, at 1914–15, 1917; see also Glaeser, supra note 63, at 23, 26 (offering anecdotal evidence
of this effect).
95. Galle, supra note 34, at 428–30.
96. Core et al., supra note 94, at 323–25.
97. Galle, supra note 34, at 437–38.
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correlate with endowment savings, including that managing money
is expensive.
Another notable mechanism that principals have used to control
their agents is a pretty basic one: being alive.98 Even in the absence of
an express right to enforce contractual terms, we might think that the
mere presence of a donor’s watchful eyes would be a meaningful
constraint on how agents behave. In line with this account, a recent
paper finds that entrepreneurial firms often crater shortly after the
death of their founder.99 Whatever insights or strategies the founder
brought to the table apparently cannot easily be committed to paper, or
if so, subsequent agents cannot be effectively compelled to follow their
inherited wisdom.
This raises an interesting question about philanthropy: What
happens to measurable agency costs when a foundation’s guiding voice
dies? Let’s turn to some data to find the answer. The only previous
findings that I am aware of are correlational studies reporting that
firms without recent donations—and thus, we might think, firms where
the donors may well be dead—tend to spend less money.100 I will argue
later that this correlation could be an indicator of agency costs.
But many other factors could probably explain the correlation. It
makes sense, then, to dig deeper and look for some evidence of
causal connections.
II. DATA
My analysis relies mostly on two large databases of private
foundations. The more familiar, for experienced readers, is the IRS
Core-PF file. Tax returns filed by charities are public documents.101 The
Core-PF is an electronic compilation of selected information from the
Form 990 tax returns of every filing private foundation, stretching from
1987 to 2012 and representing a total of about 1.3 million firm-years.102
The advantages of the Core-PF data are their universal coverage and
long time span. A downside, however, is that they collect only a very
small fraction of the total information on an organization’s return,
which itself is not a complete picture of the firm. For example, since
98. See Hansmann, supra note 28, at 33–34, 34 n.51 (noting that standard bargaining
mechanisms needed for efficiency no longer function when the donor is dead).
99. Matthew Smith, Danny Yagan, Owen Zidar & Eric Zwick, Capitalists in the Twenty-First
Century, 134 Q.J. ECON. 1675, 1675 (2019).
100. See sources cited supra note 33.
101. I.R.C. § 6104.
102. BRICE MCKEEVER, URB. INST., BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO USING NCCS DATA 2–3 (2018),
https://nccs.urban.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/Guide%20to%20Using%20NCCS%20Data.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EX55-2T8A].
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donor information is anonymized in public filings, the Core data do
not tell us anything about whether an organization still has any
living donors.
Another notable gap is that the Core data do not include the
foundation’s payout rate. For years after 1992, however, they do report
most of the necessary components needed to calculate payout, including
the organization’s investment assets and charitable-related
expenditures. These fields do not map perfectly onto the statutory
definition, but are fairly close.103 Another uncertainty is that the statute
provides foundations with two full fiscal years to make qualifying
distributions.104 It is not apparent from the Core data whether an
organization’s charitable expenditures in 2005, say, were applied to its
2004 minimum distribution amount, or instead to 2005. My calculations
of payout rates are therefore only approximate.
The Core data are also only as accurate as the reporting
organization makes them. Before implementing any analysis of these
data, I follow a “cleaning” protocol in which I omit or correct obviously
wrong (e.g., negative numbers for values that can logically only be
positive) or missing (e.g., no fiscal year listed) information. This protocol
is described in more detail elsewhere.105 I hand calculate firm age based
on the older of the reported firm founding date or the first year the firm
appears in the data; where a founding date is unavailable I simply use
the latter. To ensure that all firms are subject to the same legal rules, I
omit “private operating foundations” and “flow-through foundations,”
both of which are governed by somewhat different rules (and make up
a small slice of the data).
To make up for gaps in both the informational and temporal
coverage of the Core data, I turn to a fairly unique source: the
Foundation Directory (“FD” or “the Directory”).106 The Directory is a
publication of the Foundation Center, which now is part of the Candid
organization. It is compiled through a combination of surveys sent to
larger private foundations and other publicly available information,
such as their tax returns and requests for grant proposals. The
103. Among other issues, the statute has an assortment of technical exceptions. Some
unexpended money can count as expended (such as in the case of “program-related investment” or
money set aside for certain future projects), while some expended money can count as unexpended
(such as distributions to a controlled entity). See DARRYLL K. JONES, DAVID BRENNEN, STEVEN
WILLIS & BEVERLY MORAN, THE TAX LAW OF CHARITIES AND OTHER EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 486–
87 (3d ed. 2014).
104. I.R.C. § 4942(c). In addition, firms that exceed their minimum payout in one year can
apply the excess to later years two through six. Id. § 4942(i).
105. Galle, supra note 36, at 540–52.
106. Foundation Directory Online, CANDID, https://fconline.foundationcenter.org/ (last visited
Jan. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/WZ35-N8FH].
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Foundation Center has published the Directory on average once every
three years since the early 1960s. The economist Ben Marx has
scanned, cleaned, and used text-analysis software tools to create a
database of information reported in these periodic FD volumes,107 and
he generously shared these data with me for the years up to and
including 1992. In joint work with Marx and our coauthor Cesare
Buiatti, I extended this work to the 1998 edition as well.108
FD data do not cover the universe of private foundations but
instead are limited to those that hit either a given asset cutoff or
expenditure cutoff, each of which varies from edition to edition. In
general, the Foundation Center estimates that their reports cover
foundations in the aggregate holding more than 80% of the total assets
held by the private foundation sector. This form of sampling can lead to
selection effects if the researcher’s outcome variable of interest is
correlated with inclusion in the database, as may plausibly be the case
for payout ratios and the expenditure cutoff. My results could therefore
conceivably be driven in part by selection, although I believe the most
likely selection effect would tend to cut against the results I observe.109
To ensure apples-to-apples comparisons, I omit “community”
foundations with a broad base of public support and foundations
supported by corporations.110
Like the Core file, the FD does not directly report overhead or
payout rates. When using only FD data, I calculate overhead as the
ratio of FD’s “inside,” or non-grant-related, costs to total expenditures.
I compute payout as grants over assets, which is again not a perfect
match for the statutory definition but a decent approximation of it.
107. Benjamin M. Marx, Has Regulation of Charitable Foundations Thrown the Baby Out with
the Bath Water?, 129 J. PUB. ECON. 63, 66 (2015).
108. Cesare Buiatti, Brian Galle & Benjamin M. Marx, Risk, Return, and the Law of Trusts
in Private Foundations (June 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
109. The impact of selection would likely be to overstate the proportion of higher-payout firms,
since low expenditure firms that miss the asset cutoff would drop out of the data. Thus, selection
effects caused by sampling should tend to overinflate payout ratios. As described below, I find that
the death of a donor sharply reduces payout, so the hypothesized selection effect is working against
my results.
110. See PERRY MEHRLING, NAT’L NETWORK OF GRANTMAKERS, SPENDING POLICIES FOR
FOUNDATIONS: THE CASE FOR INCREASED GRANTS PAYOUT 6 (1999), https://efc.issuelab.org/
resources/16160/16160.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5TM-S643] (noting payout policies of community
and corporate foundations are quite different from the majority of foundations). These
organizations are also governed by somewhat different legal rules than other private foundations,
particularly in the case of community foundations. Tanya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction:
Rethinking Tax Treatment of Private Foundations and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV. 137, 141–
42 (2002). For more discussion of the differences among the groups, see ELIZABETH T. BORIS,
LOREN RENZ, ASMITA BARVE, MARK A. HAGER & GEORGE HOBOR, FOUNDATION EXPENSES &
COMPENSATION: HOW OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS INFLUENCE SPENDING 3–4 (2006),
https://www.issuelab.org/resources/16024/16024.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TSW-3VXS]. Community
and corporate foundations represent about 11% of foundations on average. Id. at 6.
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Crucially, the FD does report a complete list of each private
foundation’s supporters, as well as whether those donors were still
living at the time of the published edition. From these lists, I calculate
a number of key variables, including the number of living donors, the
last year in which a firm had any living donors, and whether the
organization is a so-called “corporate” foundation—that is, one that is
supported by a business entity rather than by individuals.111
FD data have very limited firm financial information. I therefore
match the FD data to the Core data using taxpayer ID numbers where
available from the FD and by using text-based matching on names and
addresses otherwise. This allows me to repeat my analysis for the
subset of firm-years in which I have both FD and Core-PF information.
For analysis of Core data after the temporal coverage of the FD
has ended, it is still useful to be able to distinguish between firms with
any living donors and those without. I therefore construct a predictive
model of whether a firm has any living donors, using the known
outcomes for firms with matching FD data. In essence, I look at how
each Core variable is correlated with the presence of known living
donors and then use those observed relationships to predict whether
there are any living donors for unmatched firm years.
More technically, I implement a simple probit regression in
which the outcome variable is whether the FD reports living donors in
a given firm-year, and the predictive variables are most of the other
observables available in the Core data. I then drop variables with
insignificant coefficients and repeat the analysis. Using the resulting
coefficients, I make an out-of-sample prediction of the likelihood of
living donors for each Core firm-year without matching FD data. In the
main reported results, I code firms as having predicted living donors if
they register a predicted likelihood of 80% or more.
All of these data are reported on a fiscal year basis. Firm fiscal
years only sometimes align with a calendar year. For purposes of
imposing a fixed control for time, I assign firms to a calendar year
according to a simple rubric in which firms whose fiscal years end after
June are assigned the same calendar year, while firms whose years end
in June or before are assigned the prior year. Thus, a firm-year whose
2007 fiscal year ends in July is coded as having a 2007 calendar year,
while one whose 2007 fiscal year ends in May is coded as 2006.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics. Panel A, at the top of
the table, summarizes data derived from the FD, while Panel B
summarizes Core-PF data.
111. Again, once I determine that an organization is a corporate foundation, I omit it from
subsequent analysis.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS

Panel A: Core-PF Data
Firm Age

Mean

Std. Dev.

15.817

14.894

Assets
Dividend Inc

6.1*

146*

173

3.26*

Total Expenses

Officer Compensation

575
33.23
259
12.74

14.2*
2.69*
18.4*
553

Overhead Ratio
Payout (SOI Reported)
Payout (Author Calculated)

.198
.544
.114

.278
53.415
.158

Interest Inc
Total Liabilities

Panel B: Foundation Directory Data
Firm Age
24.398
Assets
Has Living Donor

17.686

24.2*

194*

Number of Living Donors

.496
.695

.5
.907

Overhead Ratio
Payout (Author Calculated)

.165
.091

.198
.201

Notes: Core-PF values in thousands of 2011 dollars. Foundation Directory data in
thousands of 1992 dollars. *: millions.

III. THE EXPERIMENT:
AGENCY COSTS AND LIVING DONORS
I will now investigate the hypothesis that agency costs are
higher among firms without living donors. With the limited data
available in the FD dataset, I focus in on two key measurables:
overhead ratios and payout rates. As I mentioned, there is an extensive
literature documenting that donors dislike overhead, while theory
predicts that opportunistic managers might increase overhead (either
through salary or other perks, such as office space or administrative
support).112 Similarly, my theory predicts that managers will have selfserving preferences for low payout rates, making payout policy a
potentially important marker of differences in preferences between
donors and managers.

112. Desai & Yetman, supra note 91, at 62–63; see also sources cited supra note 34.
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FIGURE 1: OVERHEAD AND PAYOUT BY WHETHER FIRM HAS LIVING
(OR PREDICTED LIVING) DONORS

Just from simple line plots we can observe a strong positive
correlation between payout and the presence of living donors, as well as
a strong negative correlation between living donors and firm overhead
ratios. These correlations are evident both in the FD data, where we
have direct information on living-donor status, and also in the Core
data, where I predict the presence of living donors (as detailed in Part
II, supra).113 I plot these in Figure 1 Panels A through D.
These relationships are not necessarily causal. Other factors—
some measurable, some not—such as the age and size of the
organization, its degree of professionalization, and the nature of its
mission, might be correlated both with the presence of living donors and

113. Because the Core includes many extreme and relatively unverified observations, for Core
values I omit the highest and lowest 1% of observations before graphing. FD data are relatively
volatile when plotted on a yearly basis because the Directory is not published annually, so that for
years in between editions the number of observations is relatively small, reflecting only firms
whose data were not fully up to date at the time of publication.
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with overhead and payout.114 If that is so, it might offer an alternative
reason we see these patterns, unrelated to the presence of agency costs.
Thus, to establish a clearer causal connection, I consider the
natural experiment of the death of the last living donor. The timing of
a donor’s death is relatively random. We should not expect dramatic
shifts in factors such as the skill and experience of managers, firm size,
or organizational mission to happen to occur immediately after the lone
remaining supporter passes. These are organization-wide factors that
likely take a good deal of time to evolve into new patterns. If we indeed
see sharp changes in overhead and payout closely following the date of
death, that would accordingly be powerful evidence that these changes
are related to the inability of the donor to continue to influence them,
rather than broad organizational factors such as size or mission.
A. Graphical Results
Let’s first consider some graphical evidence. Figure 2 plots (in
Panel A, on the left) the relationship between the number of living
donors at a firm and the average overhead ratios for firms with a given
number of donors. We see a dramatic jump in overhead as we read from
right to left, from the bin with one living donor to the bin with zero
living donors. Interestingly, overhead is also gently decreasing as the
number of living donors increases. That could be consistent with a story
in which the more donor eyes there are available to monitor the firm,
the more successful donors are at moderating overhead costs.

114. See BORIS ET AL., supra note 110, at vii (reporting correlation between administrative
expenses and certain foundation missions, such as international aid).
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FIGURE 2: OVERHEAD RATIOS IN FOUNDATION DIRECTORY FIRMS

Panel B, on the right side of Figure 2, tells a similar story. Here,
I plot overhead against the number of FD editions a firm observation is
from the last edition in which it reports any living donors (recall that
the FD is published about every three years, on average). Again, we see
a sharp rise in overhead the first reporting period after the last donor
has died. Overhead is rising as we approach that date from the left. This
might represent a diminishing number of donors, diminished capacity
of the remaining donor to monitor, or some combination.
I next repeat this graphing exercise for my approximation of
payout rate, as depicted in Figure 3. Here, we see that payout drops
immediately after the death of the last donor, whether measured in
number of living donors (Panel A on the left) or in time to the last
reported edition with living donors (Panel B on the right). It also
appears that payout is highest in the edition or two before the last
donor’s passing. This might be explained as the donor having some
sense of failing health and wanting to see more projects come to fruition
during her life, as an aversion to handing assets over to managers, or
perhaps some combination.
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FIGURE 3: PAYOUT RATES IN FOUNDATION DIRECTORY FIRMS

Payout is fairly irregular once we are ten editions or more prior
to the donor’s death. While there are many factors that could explain
this result, the simplest and most likely is that I just have a relatively
small number of observations for those periods, since there are not
many organizations in the early years of the data. Alternately, it may
be that firms at this stage of their life cycle are not yet fully funded. If
donors periodically contribute large cash infusions, even a relatively
stable spending pattern would produce a fluctuating payout rate,
depending on when a donor’s most recent contribution occurred.
B. Regression Results
Regression analyses confirm with math what our eyes tell us.
Using the FD dataset, I employ a slightly modified “regressiondiscontinuity” or “RD” estimation in which the outcome variable is
either overhead (Table 2, Columns 1 and 2) or payout rate (Table 2,
Columns 3 and 4). The RD design assumes that it is random whether,
in a given reporting period, an organization has one donor or zero
donors and measures the incremental impact of randomly being
assigned zero donors.115 Thus, holding constant the identity of each

115. I describe my RD design as “slightly modified” because the unique nature of my data
makes a standard RD impractical. In the typical RD, the researcher includes both an indicator
variable for whether an observation is “treated” by the discontinuity and also a set of interaction
terms for the “running” variable on either side of the discontinuity. See generally David S. Lee &
Thomas Lemieux, Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 281
(2010) (describing the RD approach). This latter is just a measure of how far away a given
observation is from the discontinuity, as measured by whatever units the discontinuity occurs in.
Here, the discontinuity is measured in number of living donors, but on one side of the discontinuity
there is only one number: zero. In other words, I cannot include a control for the number of the
living donors at firms with zero living donors. In the RD equation below, this would have been
included as an additional term 𝛽 (𝑧 − 𝑐), but here (z – c) is always one.
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foundation and any unobserved aspects of it that do not change over my
sample period, I examine how going from one donor to zero affects
overhead and payout. For firms with living donors, I also estimate how
each incremental live donor affects these outcomes.
I control for some basic firm demographics, such as age and
assets, as well as for the calendar year and state-by-year trends.116 To
reduce the influence of outliers, I use the natural logarithm of the value
of all the variables, except for year and “indicator” variables taking only
zero-or-one values. For readers interested in equations, I summarize
the regression approach in the following equation:
𝑌&' = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝐷&' + 𝛽( (𝑧 − 𝑐)) 𝐷&' + 𝛽* 𝑋&' + λ𝑡 + 𝜑+ λ𝑡 + 𝜀&'
where Yit is the outcome variable (overhead or payout) for a given firm
i in year t, Dit is the discontinuity (an indicator variable for the presence
of any living donor), Xit is the vector of control variables, and (z – c) is
the distance from the discontinuity for the running variable, here the
number of living donors in excess of zero. The coefficient on D, ρ (rho),
represents the impact of losing the firm’s last living donor. I initially
included higher-order polynomials of the (z – c) term, but since these
were insignificant, I drop them in the reported results. λt and φsλt
represent controls for the calendar year of the observation and a set of
state by year trends, respectively. εit is the error term.

116. For regressions with payout ratio as the outcome variable, I omit a control for assets.
Since I calculate payout as spending divided by assets, if I include assets on the right-hand side I
am effectively controlling for the outcome variable with itself.
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TABLE 2: EFFECTS OF LIVING DONORS ON PF OVERHEAD AND PAYOUT,
FROM FOUNDATION DIRECTORY DATA

VARIABLES
Has Living
Donor
Fewer Than
Two Donors
Log Firm Assets
Log Firm Age
Living Donor x
Distance from
One Donor
Fewer Than
Two Donors x
Distance from
Two Donors
More Than Two
Donors x
Distance from
Two Donors
Observations
R-squared
Number of
Firms

(1)
Overhead
Treatment
-0.123***
(0.0434)
0.134***
(0.0234)
0.0312
(0.0414)

(2)
Overhead
Placebo

-0.0714
(0.0787)
0.134***
(0.0235)
0.0322
(0.0415)

-0.0414
(0.0358)

(3)
Payout
Treatment
0.0690***
(0.0264)

0.248***
(0.0330)

(4)
Payout
Placebo

0.0149
(0.0478)
0.247***
(0.0330)

0.0511**
(0.0220)
-0.0349
(0.0487)

0.0502
(0.0332)

29,086
0.144

-0.120***
(0.0433)
29,086
0.144

29,852
0.090

0.0673**
(0.0264)
29,852
0.090

6,194

6,194

6,351

6,351

Notes: Fixed-effect panel regressions with (standard errors) clustered by firm.
Includes controls for calendar year and state-by-year effects. Years cover the range
1960 to 1992, and 1998. “Placebo” treatment is effect of fewer than two donors. ***:
statistically significant at the 1% level. **: statistically significant at the 5% level.

Table 2 summarizes the results. Columns 1 and 3 are the main
treatments of interest: the results of moving from one living donor to
zero. Columns 2 and 4 are essentially placebo tests, examining the
impact of a comparable-sized move from two living donors to one.117 As
Column 1 reports, going from zero to one living donor reduces overhead
by about 12%, and this result is highly statistically significant.118 The
mean overhead ratio in the firms included in the regression is 16.5%.
Thus, my result implies that the death of the last donor on average
increases a firm’s overhead ratio by 12% x 16.5%, or 2 percentage
117. For placebo tests, I am able to include a control for the running variable on both sides of
the discontinuity. I run alternate regressions in which I omit this control in order to ensure that
including it does not drive the difference between the placebo and treatment regressions. Placebo
results when omitting the full running-variable control are essentially unchanged.
118. The 95% confidence interval is 3.8% to 20.8%.
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points. In contrast, in Column 2 I report that the impact of going from
two donors to one donor has no statistically measurable effects on
overhead, with confidence intervals that could include both substantial
increases or decreases.
Columns 3 and 4 report a similar pattern for payout ratios. As
Column 3 summarizes, a firm with one living donor has a payout that
is on average 6.9% higher than a firm with none.119 The mean payout
ratio in these firms is 9.1%. So the estimate implies that with the death
of the last donor, average payout falls by 6.9% x 9.1%, or 0.6 percentage
points.120 Again, the placebo treatment has no statistically significant
impact, with relatively wide confidence intervals.
In theory, an RD design should not need to include controls, on
the assumption that the location of a firm-year on either side of the
discontinuity (here, the date of death) is essentially as good as random
assignment.121 It is reassuring, however, to also be able to include
control variables. For instance, payout policies might be sensitive to a
firm’s investment performance. It is useful to double-check that the
donor’s presence is affecting payout directly, rather than, say, changes
in investment policies that in turn affect payout. To expand the set of
controls available, I repeat my analysis using the matched set of FD
and Core-PF data. This allows me to control for investment returns,
dividend income, and firm liabilities. As I noted, I have considerably
fewer observations in the matched set, as the FD extends back to 1960,
but the Core-PF only has reliable information back to 1988. We should
expect this smaller number of observations to cause less precisely
estimated regressions.

119. The 95% confidence interval for this result is 1.7% to 12.1%.
120. Some commentators on earlier drafts inquired whether my overhead results are actually
driven by payout. If grantmaking falls but there is no actual change in overhead expenditures, the
overhead ratio will rise mechanically. To test this theory, I repeat the overhead analysis, but using
(log) nongrant expenditures as the outcome variable instead of overhead ratio. My results are quite
similar to those reported in Table 2, Columns 1 and 2. A living donor reduces “internal” costs by
about 14%, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 5% to 23%. The move from one donor to
two has no statistically measurable effect. Thus, living donors actually reduce administrative
expenditures, not just the ratio of administration to grants.
121. See Lee & Lemieux, supra note 115, at 296–301 (discussing the need for a control in
RD design).
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TABLE 3: EFFECTS OF LIVING DONORS ON OVERHEAD AND PAYOUT,
FROM CORE-PF AND FOUNDATION DIRECTORY DATA

VARIABLES
Has Living
Donor
Fewer Than
Two Donors
Has Predicted
Living Donor
Log Investment
Return
Log Interest &
Dividend
Income
Log Liabilities
Log Firm Age
Log Firm
Assets
Living Donor x
Distance
From One
Donor
Fewer Than
Two Donors x
Distance fr.
Two
More Than Two
Donors x
Distance fr.
Two
Observations
R-squared
Number of
Firms

(1)
Overhead
Treatment
-0.229***
(0.0516)

(2)
Overhead
Placebo

0.0981
(0.0739)

(3)
Payout
Treatment
0.0856
(0.146)

(4)
Payout
Placebo

0.303
(0.289)

(5)
Payout
Predicted

0.0545**
(0.0256)

0.0540**
(0.0256)

-0.0234
(0.0318)

-0.0306
(0.0308)

0.165***
(0.00415)
0.0385***
(0.00124)

0.0970***
(0.0319)
0.0167***
(0.00537)
0.112*
(0.0644)
0.0337
(0.0410)

0.0984***
(0.0319)
0.0168***
(0.00537)
0.113*
(0.0645)
0.0331
(0.0409)

0.131**
(0.0584)
0.000221
(0.00461)
0.0717
(0.167)

0.137**
(0.0586)
0.000205
(0.00459)
0.0575
(0.163)

0.0895***
(0.00263)
0.0171***
(0.00122)
-0.418***
(0.00673)

-0.0332
(0.0290)

0.163
(0.174)
0.00693
(0.0400)

0.499**
(0.194)

12,931
0.052

-0.0745**
(0.0366)
12,931
4,977
0.052
0.049

0.0951
(0.146)
4,977
0.054

884,793
0.036

6,884

6,884

3,366

98,655

3,366

Notes: Fixed-effect panel regressions with (standard errors) clustered by firm.
Includes controls for calendar year and state-by-year effects. Columns 1 through 4:
years cover the range 1988 to 1992, and 1998. Column 5: years cover range 1988 to
2012. “Placebo” treatment is effect of fewer than two donors. ***: statistically
significant at the 1% level. **: statistically significant at the 5% level. “Predicted
living” = 80%+ predicted likelihood of having living donors, based on probit
regressions of known living status on observables.

The regressions in Table 3 suggest that including additional firm
controls yields roughly similar results. Columns 1 and 2 reconsider the
effect of living donors on overhead. In the subset of 12,931 firm-years
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with matched data (as opposed to about 29,000 in the full FD sample),
the impact on overhead is almost twice as large, with a highly
statistically significant point estimate of about a 23% increase. The
difference in estimates between here and in the FD data is driven by
the difference in which firms and years I observe, not by the controls;
when I repeat the Column 1 regression without the added firm controls,
I obtain basically the same 23% coefficient. The placebo treatment,
reported in Table 3, Column 2, remains statistically insignificant.
The payout story is a bit more complicated. In Table 3, Column
3, the point estimate for the impact of living donors on payout is similar
to the estimate from Table 2 but is not close to statistically significant.
I only have, however, about 5,000 firm-year observations in the
matched dataset with the information needed to compute a reliable
payout ratio (early years of the Core-PF only report “book” value of
assets, or their worth at the date of contribution), and this likely
explains the reduced precision of my outcome.
For an alternative approach, I use the predicted presence of
living donors, as described in Part II, above. I then examine the simple
correlation between this predicted marker and payout in the nearly
900,000 firm-years of the Core-PF sample for which I can compute
payout.122 As Table 3, Column 5 reports, payout is on average 16.5%
higher among firms predicted to have living donors, and (as expected,
given the enormous sample size) this result is very precisely estimated.
For the result reported in the table, I use a cutoff of 80% predicted
likelihood for whether a firm-year is coded as having living donors. This
estimate is not especially sensitive to varying the probability cutoff, as
summarized in Figure 4. The measured effect is somewhat larger when
I require a 90% likelihood that the firm has living donors, implying that
at lower certainties, the impact of “treatment” may be diluted by
including some untreated firms.

122. Because the Core-PF files often include unverified data, and result in some
measurements that are eye-openingly extreme (e.g., payout ratios in the millions), I omit the top
and bottom 1% of firms by payout.
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FIGURE 4: EFFECTS OF PREDICTED LIVING
DONORS AT VARYING “PREDICTED” CUTOFFS

IV. INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS
A. What Do the Results Tell Us?
Overall, I interpret both the overhead and payout effects as
evidence of agency costs. Whether declines in payout rates are evidence
of agency costs is open to debate, but I tend to believe that they are.
Such dramatic differences during life and afterwards strongly suggest
that donors and managers have different preferences about how quickly
to spend the organization’s money and that managers’ views prevail as
soon as the donor’s direct influence is removed. As I mentioned earlier,
managers have several potential reasons for preferring slower spending
that are not generally shared by donors, such as the desire to protect a
safe and comfortable job.123 It also appears from Figure 3, Panel B that
managers steadily lower payout rates after the donor has died, until the
average eventually reaches the statutory minimum. While the trend is
highly suggestive, I cannot clearly establish a causal link between that
decline and agency costs.

123. See supra text accompanying notes 86–89. This is not to say some donors may not also
enjoy the thought of a perpetual legacy. Halperin, supra note 50, at 125.
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One potential counterargument to an agency-cost interpretation
of the payout results could be that living donors in fact have similar
payout rates to managers, but donors have a larger denominator: they
are spending out of both funds already in the firm and also future
planned gifts.124 Or, put another way, living donors can direct the
organization to spend more because they know they can restock the
firm’s cupboards, but, after the donor’s death, managers know that they
have a fixed pool of principal to manage.
This alternative hypothesis struggles to explain the observed
data. On this theory, we should expect that donor-controlled spending
rates will diminish close to the end of the donor’s life. At that point, the
donor likely understands that she will not have much time for earning
more money and that the portion of her estate set aside for charity likely
represents all the available resources. Effectively, her “denominator,”
or pool of capital, is about the same size as the pool available to
managers shortly after her death. We should thus expect to see similar
payout rates both shortly before and shortly after the donor’s demise.
Instead, in Figure 2 we see a rise in spending by donors who are close
to death and then a sharp decline in spending by managers thereafter.
Again, the peak in spending just before death is consistent with an
agency-cost story in which donors would prefer to allocate money
themselves than to leave that task to heirs and managers.
Admittedly, there are two potential explanations for my
overhead finding that may not necessarily involve agency costs. Indeed,
in one of these rival theories, donors want their private foundation to
spend money on overhead, because that money is primarily paid to or
enjoyed by the donor’s heirs. Tax planners regularly advise wealthy
clients that this ability to use tax-deductible dollars to pay out
reasonable expenses, even to heirs, is an attractive feature of the
private foundation rules.125 While I cannot rule out this story, as I noted
earlier, in prior work I found that overhead is on average lower when
donors have more control over an organization.126 It is still possible that
some donors desire high overhead, but the overall preference seems to
be in the opposite direction.
Another possible theory that could explain my overhead result
is that donors provide valuable free services to their foundations.127
124. I am grateful to Eric Talley for making this point.
125. Victoria B. Bjorklund, Giving to the Private Foundation, Donor-Advised Fund and
Supporting Organization, SS045 ALI-ABA 431, 462–63 (2011) (noting private foundation is
preferable choice when donor wants organization to “pay for his involvement”).
126. Galle, supra note 34, at 428–30.
127. See BORIS ET AL., supra note 110, at 15 (hypothesizing that their finding that family
foundations have lower overhead could be explained by family provision of free services).
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Once the donor has died, the organization can no longer rely on those
services and must pay to replace them. My placebo results help to rule
out this alternative, however. As Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 show,
there is no comparable impact of moving from two donors to one, even
though this is a loss of the same amount of donor labor as the move from
one to zero.
As an additional check on the lost-labor story, I use the combined
FD-Core data to confirm that my overhead result persists even if I limit
the sample to firm-years in which the foundation reports paying its
officers.128 In other words, in firms where officers are paid when the
donor is alive, overhead costs still go up after her death. Neither of these
results is totally inconsistent with the lost-labor theory, but they do
make it less likely.
In any event, to the extent that these alternatives might
challenge my overhead account, neither makes an especially appealing
case for perpetual philanthropy. Both suggest that taxpayer dollars are
being misspent by long-lived organizations: either donor heirs claim
resources that were supposed to be subject to the estate tax or dedicated
to charitable purposes, or organizations that persist long past the
donor’s life incur large expenditures that more limited-term entities
would not.
B. Policy Implications of the Results
Gaps of this magnitude between donor preferences and
managerial behavior suggest that perpetual philanthropy is not the
best use of social resources. Again, we give up tax dollars to support
philanthropy because we think charitable giving creates a double
benefit: it makes donors satisfied with their good works, and it allows
for the production of goods with positive externalities that the private
market would struggle to provide.129 Agency slack suggests our returns
on both sides of this equation are lower. Obviously, donors do not get as
much of what they want. But also, some portion of the resources that
are supposed to go to beneficiaries are instead used to satisfy the
private desires of managers for stable and comfortable careers.
To be sure, overhead and other administrative expenses are not
always wasteful, but instead can represent payment for important
sources of added value, such as project management expertise.130 It is
128. The 95% confidence interval for the effects of a living donor in this specification ranges
from -8.5% to -28%.
129. See supra Part I.A.
130. Peter Frumkin & Mark T. Kim, Strategic Positioning and the Financing of Nonprofit
Organizations: Is Efficiency Rewarded in the Contributions Marketplace?, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
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conceivable that donors are overly reluctant to incur these kinds of
costs.131 If that were true systematically, then it could be the case that
agency costs are actually good, to the extent that they allow these valueadding expenditures to rise closer to socially optimal levels. My data do
not offer a clear picture of what higher overhead is buying.
Rising overhead is most concerning, then, because overhead and
payout are likely to be only the tip of the agency iceberg. These two
variables are probably the easiest of all charitable outputs to measure,
as they can be computed readily from basic financial information.
Managers influence many other crucial decisions that are much more
difficult to observe, such as what kinds of missions to support and how
risky the organization’s choices about grantees and investments should
be.132 If agency costs are high for the outcomes that are easy to measure
(and, hence, for donors to supervise), they are likely even higher for
these others.
Here again, we have losses for both donors and society at large.
Anecdotal evidence that donors care a lot about their organization’s
grantees and choice of mission can be found nearly everywhere in
philanthropic literature, including in the promotional materials of at
least one prominent DSO, which offers to help donors limit their heirs’
choices.133 On the beneficiary side, a long-standing critique of big
philanthropy is its isolation from outside influence.134 Social science
tells us that organizations that are not answerable to anyone rarely
perform as well as those that are more accountable.135
266, 272 (2001). But see Core et al., supra note 94, at 321 (“[T]his ratio is widely used as a measure
of efficiency and performance . . . .”).
131. Cf. Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
819, 864–65 (2012) (offering reasons donors might fail to understand how to effectively monitor for
agency costs).
132. The challenge of measuring nonprofit outputs is almost axiomatic, given that this
difficulty is one of the factors that motivates adoption of the nonprofit form. Hansmann, supra
note 67, at 623. For an interesting description of how nonprofit service organizations try (but
largely fail) to articulate meaningful outcome measures, see John C. Sawhill & David Williamson,
Mission Impossible? Measuring Success in Nonprofit Organizations, 11 NONPROFIT MGMT. &
LEADERSHIP 371, 377–86 (2001).
133. Bequest Accounts and Planned Giving, DONORSTRUST, https://www.donorstrust.org/
what-we-offer/bequest-accounts-planned-giving/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
MYN5-GGA4] (“You will also leave with us a donor intent statement, amendable by you at any
time during your lifetime, so there is no question as to how you want your charitable legacy to
be spent.”).
134. Eric Franklin Amarante, The Perils of Philanthrocapitalism, 78 MD. L. REV. 1, 17–18
(2018); Brody, supra note 6, at 920–28.
135. Elisabeth S. Clemens, The Constitution of Citizens: Political Theories of Nonprofit
Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 207, 208, 211–12 (Walter W.
Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2006); Marc Hooghe, Voluntary Associations and Democratic
Attitudes: Value Congruence as a Causal Mechanism, in GENERATING SOCIAL CAPITAL: CIVIL
SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 89, 106 (Marc Hooghe & Dietlind Stolle
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To be sure, this last point might be made into something of an
argument in favor of agency costs, but I think that claim would go too
far. The point would be that mega-rich donors are even more isolated
and elitist in their attitudes than nonprofit managers. As between
forever foundations controlled by their original donors and those
controlled by professional managers, we might actually prefer the
latter.136 That may be so, but it neglects a third potential option:
organizations that are subject to payout requirements high enough
that, in order to survive, they must raise new money. If manager
insulation from donors creates agency costs, or manager isolation from
society otherwise reduces the quality of their work, we should
ensure that organizations have continuing incentives to be open
and accountable to potential supporters. That is what a payout rule
can do.137
This is not to say that the case in favor of payout rules
necessarily supports the exact current design of U.S. law. Many of the
goals of a payout policy can be met if distribution amounts are based on
a rolling average over several years, as some have proposed.138 Payout
rates could also vary with market conditions or the economy, as in some
prior suggestions to encourage foundation distributions during
economic downturns.139 In any event, the exact level of payout should
probably be sufficient to put some modest pressure on organizations to
seek out new funding, and whether a steady 5% obligation achieves that
is an empirical question for later work.140
eds., 2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71,
85–96 (2000).
136. See Iris J. Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity Can Do for You: Robertson v. Princeton
Provides Liberal-Democratic Insights into the Dilemma of Cy Pres Reform, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 123
(2009); Melanie B. Leslie, Time to Sever the Dead Hand: Fisk University and the Cost of the Cy
Pres Doctrine, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 16–17 (2012); Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley
Can Teach Us About the Charitable Deduction, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 957, 974 (2010); Allison Anna
Tait, The Secret Economy of Charitable Giving, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1663, 1715 (2015). For an argument
about why leaving donors out of nonprofit governance is undesirable, see Dana Brakman Reiser,
Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV.
829, 865–86 (2003).
137. See MEHRLING, supra note 110, at 10 (“[P]ayout rates should be high enough that
foundations are required to attract new funds in order to pursue their missions.”).
138. See Halperin, supra note 50, at 127 (offering this suggestion with respect to
university endowments).
139. YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS 45–46
(2019); Salamon, supra note 33, at 251; Eugene Steuerle, Distribution Requirements for
Foundations, 70 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N 423, 426 (1977); see Galle, supra note 3, at 1196–98
(showing through data simulations that other proposals would not result in meaningful
countercyclical spending and recommending more robust adjustments to payout rules).
140. Cf. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 276 (2004)
(noting that appropriate payout rate likely varies with economic variables and mission
of organization).
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The results also speak to the debate about DSOs. Admittedly,
agency costs are likely somewhat different at DSOs than at private
foundations, but they share some broad features. Both foundation
managers and DSO operators benefit from slow spending. The DSO is
paid based on a share of assets under management, giving it little
incentive to encourage donors to recommend quicker giving.141 Each of
the nation’s large “commercial” DSOs contracts with a for-profit
partner, with fees that reportedly vary quite substantially.142 It is
unclear if DSO managers have any real incentive to negotiate these
fees. By a remarkable coincidence, no major commercial DSO seems to
have ever contracted with any partner except the for-profit investment
firm that founded the DSO, suggesting that there is little genuine
competition for management fees.143
In any event, at a minimum my results suggest that DSOs
should not provide easy loopholes for escaping payout rules. As Roger
Colinvaux and Ray Madoff have argued, a DSO should not be available
as an easy way to satisfy a private foundation’s 5% payout requirement,
nor should contributions from a single DSO account allow the donee
organization to escape private foundation status.144
High agency costs also offer reasons to reconsider the set of state
laws that tend to encourage perpetual spending. In fifteen states,
organizational managers are presumed to act “imprudently,” and thus
contrary to law, if they spend more than 7% of a firm’s assets in a
year.145 As I have reported before, these laws indeed seem to reduce
spending, and if anything may tend to reduce giving.146 Forty-nine
states and D.C. also presume that if a donor places any restrictions on
assets she leaves to a charity that she also intends that those assets be
preserved in perpetuity.147 Although in theory that presumption can be

141. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42595, AN ANALYSIS OF
CHARITABLE GIVING AND DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 7 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42595.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3TQ-4CL8].
142. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 21, at 63; Colinvaux, supra note 16, at 22–23.
As Jake Brooks notes, fees at some organizations seem to approximate the value of the tax savings
offered by the DSO. John R. Brooks, The Missing Tax Benefit of Donor-Advised Funds, 150 TAX
NOTES 1013, 1016 (2016).
143. See Alan M. Cantor, Wall Street’s Charitable Gold Rush, INSIDE PHILANTHROPY
(Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2015/2/25/wall-streets-charitable-goldrush.html [https://perma.cc/H9RT-D42D] (noting that each investment firm has its own “inhouse” DSO).
144. Roger Colinvaux & Ray D. Madoff, Charitable Tax Reform for the 21st Century, 164 TAX
NOTES 1867, 1871–74 (2019).
145. Galle, supra note 3, at 1200 & n.281. For discussion of the presumption and its operation,
see Gary, supra note 35, at 1314–16.
146. Galle, supra note 3, at 1201.
147. Gary, supra note 35, at 1305–07, 1311.
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drafted around by counsel, as I and others have found, these kinds of
default provisions seem to have real impact on nonprofit (and
noncharitable trust) behavior.148 Lastly, important accounting rules
require charitable managers to act as though endowment funds
are intended to last forever, and these rules purport to implement
state law.149
Even if we weren’t going to reform the law of perpetual giving,
my findings suggest there could be some benefit in encouraging donors
to give money to charity while they are alive, instead of at the time of
their death. Money that is donated before death is more likely to be
spent according to the preferences of the living donor. Prior
commentators have not considered the possibility that these kinds of
rules might be desirable, but the sharp divide I find between firms with
living donors and firms without suggests there could be a lot of social
value in them. Let me offer a few initial suggestions.
The estate tax (or potentially some substitutes for it, such as a
tax on the inheritances received by noncharitable heirs) could offer
powerful incentives to give during life. That might seem
counterintuitive. If my estate is not subject to tax, then a charitable
contribution deduction against the estate tax does not have any value
to me, so that it might appear that lower estate taxes reduce incentives
to give at death. Crucially, however, giving to charity during life is
usually an even better way to reduce the estate tax than giving at death,
so that the bigger and more generally applicable the estate tax, the
more inter vivos gifts we should expect.150 A gift during life reduces the
donor’s income taxes as well as her estate taxes.151 For high net-worth
individuals, the charitable contribution deduction must often be spread
out over several years in order to maximize its income-tax value.152 So
this is not an option donors can use effectively in their last year of life.
Once money is transferred to charity during the donor’s life, it is
also important to ensure the money is spent during her life, not
afterwards. As we saw, most organizations with living donors do spend
quite vigorously. But to the extent that some might not, a payout rule
helps to ensure that money is spent at a time when agency costs are
low. In my data, we do not observe many organizations with very low
148. Galle, supra note 36, at 543–46; Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform
of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Investment Allocation?, 50 J.L. & ECON.
681, 687–88, 696–707 (2007).
149. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 36, app. ¶¶ A12–13.
150. For theoretical discussion and review of the available evidence, see Wojciech Kopczuk,
Taxation of Intergenerational Transfers and Wealth, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 329,
361–63 (Alan J. Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Martin Feldstein & Emmanuel Saez eds., 2013).
151. Kopczuk, supra note 150, at 361.
152. Brakman Reiser, supra note 49, at 955.
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payouts, because of course current law requires distributions of at least
5%. But there is reason to believe rates could be quite a bit lower in the
absence of this rule. For instance, IRS data suggest that among DSOs,
which have no payout requirement, about one-fifth of organizations
have average annual payout rates of less than 1%.153
Another possibility my findings suggest is to reconsider the rules
applicable to private foundation payments to family members of the
main supporter. Again, one alternate interpretation of my overhead
finding is that some organizations actually prefer high overhead once
the donor has passed on, because this is a way to exploit a loophole in
the combined estate tax-private foundation regime. The estate tax
system effectively relies on the rules governing charitable organizations
to ensure that money exempted from the estate tax as a charitable
donation is in fact used for charitable purposes, not for the benefit of
the decedent’s friends and family. But private foundation rules in turn
allow heirs to be paid substantial salaries and benefit from “reasonable”
administrative costs, such as for semiannual board meetings in
Key West.154
This is an estate tax problem, and it should have an estate tax
solution.155 Private foundations of course should be entitled to pay
reasonable employee compensation and other expenses. If, however,
those payments benefit a relative of the organization’s substantial
contributors, or other individuals bequeathed a substantial sum in the
contributors’ wills, those payments should be included as part of the
taxable estate. The rule would ensure that applicable estate-tax rates
are imposed on these payments, which after all are basically an effort
to escape from those taxes. In many cases, the correct tax rate is zero:
if the foundation makes a payment to an heir whose benefactor’s estate
would not have been taxable, there is no tax avoidance and there should
not be any penalty. Current nonprofit law fails to achieve either of these
results, imposing too much tax on some payments and not enough on
others. I would extend the penalty not just to heirs but also to others
named in the will as a way of reaching lovers, close friends, and others
whose bequests would usually be taxable; nonprofit law currently
reaches only excess payments to the donor’s relatives.156

153. Arnsberger, supra note 24, at 67.
154. Galle & Madoff, supra note 15, at 6.
155. Cf. Halperin, supra note 55, at 303 (noting that tax subsidies for charitable accumulation
are more palatable if donors retain little control over the charitable organization).
156. Treas. Reg. § 53.4946-1 (1972). Of course, this rule could be planned around by leaving
the beneficiary nothing directly, except the right to be paid by the private foundation, but this
result would probably be very undesirable for individuals with millions of dollars to donate to
favored beneficiaries.
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CONCLUSION
I have offered new causal evidence of significant agency costs at
philanthropic organizations. When donors are available to monitor
foundation managers, and can threaten to withhold future donations, it
appears that managers likely spend faster and are more careful to hold
down administrative expenses. Tax and nonprofit law each encourage
organizations to incur these costs. While debate should and will
continue about how to remedy that problem, at a minimum, my findings
suggest that more conversation is appropriate.

